Demi Bride Trafficking: A Unique Trend of Human Trafficking from South-East Asia To China by Lhomme, Laetitia et al.
Journal of International Women's Studies 
Volume 22 
Issue 3 Women's Studies: The Possibility of 




Demi Bride Trafficking: A Unique Trend of Human Trafficking from 




Follow this and additional works at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws 
 Part of the Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lhomme, Laetitia; Zhong, Siren; and Du, Billie (2021). Demi Bride Trafficking: A Unique Trend of Human 
Trafficking from South-East Asia To China. Journal of International Women's Studies, 22(3), 28-39. 
Available at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol22/iss3/4 
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State 
University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts. 
This journal and its contents may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or 
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form 
to anyone is expressly forbidden. ©2021 Journal of International Women’s Studies. 
28 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 22, No. 3 April 2021 
 
 
Demi Bride Trafficking: A Unique Trend of Human Trafficking from South-East Asia To 
China 
 




 Every year, hundreds of thousands of women and girls from Southeast Asia are forced or 
tricked into marrying Chinese men who exploit them for sex and childbearing. Although an 
emerging body of research and reports has revealed the scale and living conditions of the trafficked 
brides, there have not yet been systematic studies that would help stakeholders understand the real 
needs of the victims. Bride trafficking victims are generally defined as those who are deprived of 
their rights and married against their will. However, our investigation found that in China, cases 
which involve seemingly willing victims are barely covered by the current trafficking victim 
identification system, despite the existence of “the principle of the irrelevance of consent” 
(UNODC, 2014). Due to the lack of unified measures and feasible research methods, empirical 
research on such groups is very limited. In an effort to fill this gap, this article identifies this 
category as “demi bride trafficking” and includes an academic exploration of the transnational 
trafficked marriages in China as well as a descriptive analysis based on the interviews of various 
NGOs, experts, and government officials. By analysing the dysfunction of external interventions 
and the potential link between the Belt Road Initiative and the increasing number of human 
trafficking cases, this paper then suggests that currently, the most effective solution is to address 
it internally, with a focus on fulfilling victims’ individual demands, which in turn requires an 
individual tailored victim protection system to be built. 
 




Bride trafficking from Southeast Asia to China can be dated back to the 1980s. During that 
period, borders in Southeast Asia began to open, and transnational financial activities were 
growing. The weak management control system in the border areas promoted the human 
trafficking industry. That is, with the natural geographical advantage of the Great Mekong 
Subregion (GMS), new networks and cross-border transportations made it more convenient for 
traffickers to transport victims from China, Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand to supply sex trade 
(Emmers, 2003). 
Since 2000, however, following China’s economic growth, the number of bride trafficking 
cases from the GMS to China has gradually increased and become one of the primary forms of 
cross-border human trafficking in the region. According to the Vietnamese official data, more than 
3,000 women and children were trafficked between 2012 and 2017 (Vu, 2018). In the same period, 
Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT) has estimated that 7,500 Myanmar women had 
gone through forced marriage and childbearing to Chinese men, and those women suffered from 
both psychological and physical abuse (Robinson & Branchini, 2018). All these figures reveal just 
the tip of the iceberg of the bride trafficking industry from Southeast Asian countries to China.  
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Corresponding to this increase in transnational bride trafficking, the Chinese government 
modified its national laws to respond to the international standard of countering human trafficking. 
However, its practices are still limited because neither the Palermo Protocol nor China’s domestic 
laws explicitly include bride trafficking in its definition of human trafficking. As a whole, China 
still has no effective laws for preventing bride trafficking. But even if specific law modifications 
that counter bride trafficking were passed in the next few years, this problem would not be wholly 
solved. The transnational bride trafficking phenomenon is still far from being eradicated through 
legal regulations, mainly due to the complexities lying behind the trafficking itself.  
The crux of this paper’s purpose is to answer the questions: what are the unique 
characteristics of bride trafficking in China and what are the main needs of the victims? The 
methodological framework of this paper combines half-structural interviews with NGOs and 
Chinese government officials who implemented the victim assistance/resettlement project, as well 
as analysis of secondary resources. This analysis will start with a brief explanation of the bride 
purchasing phenomenon in China. It will then introduce the unique form of human trafficking in 
China, which we defined as “demi-bride trafficking”. This unusual type of trafficking is neglected 
a lot by previous researchers, and the related victims are not covered by the current victim 
identification system. By exploring the existing counter-human trafficking operations in China and 
how the whole industry is expanding alongside China’s developing plans, this paper emphasises 
the urgency and potential approaches to build an individual tailored victim protection system. 
 
 
Bride Trafficking in Southeast Asia and China 
 So far, there is no universal definition of bride trafficking (UNDOC, 2020). Bride 
trafficking, also called bride purchasing, is a special form of sex trafficking that is based on the 
commodification of females, yet it is different from sex trafficking. The exploitation involved in 
bride trafficking is more precisely related to the commercialization of marriages—generally, it 
enables the female brides to be sold to male buyers, and its purpose is not to find a person’s love 
partner, but to fulfil the need of male buyers to arrange a wife who can function as a sex object, a 
birth-giving machine, and a domestic worker (UNDOC, 2020). Yet what needs to be noted here is 
that such a close connection with marriage makes the bride trafficking phenomenon doomed to be 
affected by different marriage-related cultural factors in different regions. This may also help 
explain why it is rarely possible to set an applicable worldwide definition of “bride trafficking”, 
which means that it would be better to analyse the cultural and financial complexities of bride 
trafficking from a regional level. 
When it comes to cultural aspects, in most Asian countries, bride trafficking has its deep 
inseparable relationships with forced marriage, or arranged marriage, which in turn is connected 
to one important marriage-related tradition: matchmaking (Hackney, 2015). Matchmaking is a 
tradition in both Southeast Asia and China in which the males’ families give a “bride price” to the 
brides’ families to indicate their financial ability (Molland, 2011). Later, attracted by the generous 
“bride price” that Chinese males are willing to pay, traffickers boosted illegal trafficking 
businesses across borders. In some cases, the female victim may voluntarily move to China for a 
marriage to gain a better financial status, only to later realize she was deceived after ending up in 
a poor suburban family. Thus, the concept of voluntariness in those transnational marriages makes 
it hard to find a clear boundary between a bride trafficking case and a simply unsuccessful arranged 
marriage, in turn making bride trafficking a unique form of human trafficking in Southeast Asia. 
This is also why the United Nations has pointed out that when trafficking occurs for the purpose 
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of forced or servile marriage it is not always possible for it to be recognized as a crime because of 
these cultural reasons (UNODC, 2018). 
Another regional aspect that needs to be analysed is the economic conditions in Southeast 
Asia and China. Currently, there are some cases in which the female is victimized as a bride but 
later attracted by the better financial conditions in the new home; she may voluntarily choose to 
stay in China. In turn, even though females like this meet the basic elements of being victims of 
bride trafficking, they are still not covered by the victim identification system in China. This is 
because these victims are hard to recognize and find from the very beginning of the identification 
process. In addition, with the further development of economic cooperation in the GMS, 
transnational population flow and huge financial benefits brought by economic differences among 
countries will increase, which will only make this trend of bride trafficking between Southeast 
Asian countries and China more severe in the future. 
 
 
The Trend of Bride Purchasing 
  As a special form of human trafficking and transnational criminality, bride trafficking 
between Southeast Asian countries and China has its inevitability as a social phenomenon, not only 
due to the cultural reasons which have been mentioned in the second section, but also due to the 
complicated financial reasons behind each individual buyer and each bride. In this section, we are 
going to focus on the two endpoints of this purchasing chain – the Chinese male buyers and the 
Southeast Asian girls for supply – and analyse their vulnerable situations and essential demands in 
their social contexts. 
 
The Male Buyers and their Demands 
 In 1978, the Chinese government promulgated the one-child policy. Many married couples, 
especially those in rural areas, still favour having a son to carry on the male family name. This 
attitude is rooted in the minds of older Chinese generations because of the country’s patriarchal 
tradition. Thus, sex-selective abortions and female infanticide caused the huge unbalanced ratio 
between male and female in China’s population, and it further affected the bride market in those 
most touched areas such as the neighbouring countries.  
According to the national economic data for 2019 released by the National Bureau of 
Statistics, by the end of 2019, China's male population was 31.64 million more than that of female 
(China Industry Information, 2019). The imbalance in the marriage market has led to a prevalence 
of involuntary bachelorhood marriages, as well as an increase in marriage costs such as betrothal 
gifts and wedding ceremony fees. In the villages with high female rural-to-urban migration, the 
surplus male groups are required to offer a house and around $15-25,000 US dollars to the bride’s 
family, but the average yearly salary in the village is only one-fifth that amount. Comparatively, 
$4,500-5,500 US dollars is the average price for a wife from Southeast Asian countries. According 
to statistics, more than 11,500 out of 13,422 transnational marriage families belong to low-income 
families, accounting for 86% of the total (Yu & Gao, 2019). For those who cannot afford high 
marriage expenses, buying a wife is just an economical and practical option. This figure also 
reflects Hudson and Boer’s theory that males’ demand for marriage and sex often stimulates crimes 
against females, such as rape, forced marriage, and modern slavery (Hudson, 2002).  
In addition, the development of China's society and the improvement of gender equality, 
women's self-consciousness, and independence have become stronger, and their dependence on 
their husbands has been greatly reduced (Lewis, 2020). However, certain Chinese men have not 
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progressed; the "masculinity" of men and the "traditional virtue" of women remains deeply rooted 
in their minds. In a family structure, they are trying desperately to maintain old, gendered power 
dynamics. The image of a submissive, easily controlled wife is very appealing to these men. Thus, 
men with this ideology will seek out illiterate, docile, and obedient foreign women who are 
accustomed to poor living conditions as their wives in order to achieve their ideal marriage 
situation. 
 
The Girls for Supply and their Vulnerable Situations 
 Although the brides trafficked to China are from different countries in Southeast Asia, there 
are some common factors of these vulnerable situations shared by the victims. First of all, a 
majority of victims are unschooled, come from ethnic minorities, live in rural areas, and greatly 
suffer from poverty (ASEAN, 2019). Local threats such as military conflicts and natural disasters 
also increase the vulnerability of their situations. Take Myanmar, for instance; 90% of Myanmar 
victims in bride trafficking are from Kachin minority, an ethnic community affected by the internal 
conflict in Myanmar (ASEAN, 2019). The armed conflict displaced many girls and put them under 
extreme financial hardship. In order to escape poverty, political conflicts, and a displaced living 
status, going to China is often regarded as a relatively better choice for these girls to fulfil their 
basic financial needs and to gain a peaceful life, even though it also means that they might be 
trapped and suffer later in China and be identified as illegal immigrants instead of victims. 
Because of this, it was not surprising to find in our investigations that bride-trafficking 
victims exist with varying degrees of voluntary willingness. In some cases, this willingness occurs 
in the first stage, during which the victims voluntarily enter China for marriages but are later 
trapped by fraudulent documents, domestic violence, and sexual exploitation. In other cases, this 
willingness occurs after they are victimized and trafficked to China, when they voluntarily choose 
to stay at their buyers’ homes. Despite the fact that “the principle of irrelevance of consent”1 is 
used internationally to help identify victims of human trafficking, the difficulties to define the 
voluntary level and the degree of victimization in cases like these are still making these trafficked 
victims harder to identify, which has subsequently brought new challenges for the law enforcement 
and NGOs who want to assist. In turn, a more detailed victim identification system which fits into 
the status quo is urgently needed. To better identify overlooked bride trafficking victims, we 
proposed a notion of “demi-bride trafficking” (DBT). 
 
 
The Victims of Demi-Bride Trafficking in China 
Two Categories of Demi-bride Trafficking with Case Studies 
 
Type 1 
 According to our interview with government officers from different regions, there is an 
increasing number of cases where women choose to stay in China voluntarily. The reasons can be 
roughly divided into three aspects. First, the victims are lucky enough to enter a family without 
violence or abuse. The buyer wins the trust of the victims with goodwill and gives them hope of a 
normal life. Second, the traditional family value advises Southeast Asian girls to be contented with 
the man they have “married” and to take the responsibility to raise the kids. Thus, for the women 
who have already given birth to children with the buyers, even if they are dissatisfied with their 
 
1 According to “the principle of irrelevance of consent”, consent of the victim to the intended exploitation is 
irrelevant when the exploitive actions and means have been used (UNODC,2020).  
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life, they would still choose to stay, in consideration of the growth of their children and the 
responsibility they have as mothers. Plus, most of them have no financial ability to be single 
mothers, so they prefer to maintain their existing families. The last reason then refers to conflict 
in the girls’ home countries, which applies mainly to Burmese women. Burmese victims, 
especially those from Rakhine and the Kachin State, are suffering from armed conflicts and 
displacement. On the contrary, staying in China provides them with a relatively more stable social 
environment. So even if they are trafficked and abused, they prefer to stay in China, because at 
least there their most basic survival needs are guaranteed. 
Though these women were victims of bride trafficking, they often voluntarily accept their 
fates later which makes them unaware of their need for compensation for their victimization in the 
first place. In turn, their life seems not distinctive from those of normal Chinese citizens on the 
surface, and they cannot be easily identified as victims of bride trafficking. Even if in some cases 
victims in this category manage to be identified and are under investigation by the police, a 
combination of voluntariness and victimization still makes it hard for the police to produce a 
suitable corresponding solution on how to deal with such victims.  
 
Case Study 
Fan2 used to be an ordinary girl in Myanmar before she was drugged and trafficked to 
China. "When I woke up, the traffickers told me that I had been sold to China, if I wanted to return 
to Vietnam, I had to pay back 2000 yuan," said Fan. She continued, "If there is no ransom money, 
I have to stay there until someone comes to buy me. " 
Ten days after, a Chinese young man paid 2000 yuan to buy Fan as a wife. The husband 
took her back to his home in a poor and remote area. Fan’s fear of being locked up and sexually 
exploited did not happen to her; instead, she was loved and treated nicely by her husband. The fact 
that their relationship started “commercially and illegally” did not affect their intimacy and 
romance. After they had two children, Fan said that although she had thoughts of escaping back to 
her hometown, due to good treatment from her husband and her traditional family values, she 
dropped this idea and decided to forget her original family in Vietnam. 
 
Type 2 
The second categories of “demi-bride trafficking” victims are those who have shown their 
voluntary willingness to enter China for a real marriage at first but later find themselves trapped. 
Many brokers, who want to get great profits from transnational matchmaking between Southeast 
Asian countries and China, would first go to the targeted countries to look for girls in vulnerable 
situations and convince them that marrying a Chinese man is a relatively good way to solve their 
families’ financial difficulties. In turn, this first stage does involve some degree of voluntary 
willingness from the victims. For such cases which involve certain degrees of victim’s consent to 
the marriage, the United Nations has pointed out that according to the “principle of irrelevance of 
consent”, the victim’s consent to the marriage itself is irrelevant in the process of identifying 
victims because the existence of the exploitive actions and means can already fulfil the concept of 
“receiving intended exploitation” (UNODC, 2020). This principle does seem to help identify this 
group of victims, but the problem is, current laws in China are not in line with this principle; when 
such cases are under investigation, the violence the victims have suffered is often regarded as 
domestic violence, instead of bride trafficking exploitation.  
 
2 All victims’ names have been changed to protect their identities.  
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In addition, girls in poverty are more likely to follow customary laws or tribal practices in 
marriage because they come from uneducated families. The fact that they do not have an official 
marriage certificate gave the buyers’ families opportunities to take advantage of these brides’ legal 
statuses, and then use imprisonment and deportation as threats to make them give up the idea of 
escaping. In turn, even if sometimes these women manage to turn to the police for help, or if they 
are found by the police, out of fear of being found illegal they do not offer accurate narratives of 
their experiences, which in turn makes them unidentifiable as victims of trafficking because there 
is no proof of exploitation. Because of this, “the principle of irrelevance of consent” cannot protect 
victims because their “consent to the marriage” and their illegal entry prevents them from telling 
their true stories to police in the first place. 
 
Case Study 
 The case is about a Laotian girl whose name is Pan3. The matchmaker gave Pan’s family 
$4,200 USD as a bride price and told Pan that her marriage to her future Chinese husband would 
be legitimate, and that she could leave this husband freely if she didn’t like the family in China. 
Believing this to be true, Pan followed the matchmaker to China to meet her future husband. 
Pan enjoyed the marriage in the beginning; she even posted her husband’s pictures on her 
social media to show her happiness. However, everything changed after she discovered her 
husband’s obsession with having a baby. Every time she refused to have sex he would lock her in 
the bathroom for the whole day. She later also learned that she entered China with a tourist visa, 
and no marriage certificate was ever issued. Her passport and telephone were kept by her husband. 
She tried to run away, but the man told her that he paid $30,000 USD to the matchmaker, and he 
would not let Pan go back to Laos if he could not get the money returned. It was at that time that 
Pan understood she was a victim of human trafficking. 
Unlike other human trafficking cases, in Pan’s case she accepted the bride price and 
voluntarily married a Chinese man. In cases like Pan’s, women realize they are victims once they 
find out that their marriages are illegal and that they cannot run away from their buyers. 
 
The Essential Demands from DBT Victims 
For the first type of victims who stay in China voluntarily, their primary needs are to obtain 
social benefits, custodial rights, and legal protection in China. Their rights are restricted in land 
distribution, employment, medical care, endowment insurance, etc., which could cause them life-
long instability. Without legal immigration status, they will always live in a vulnerable position 
and have a fear of deportation or re-trafficking.  
In addition, language barriers hinder their communication, which makes it difficult for 
them to integrate into the surrounding communities and find a sense of belonging. Being foreign 
in a largely homogenous society such as China’s, they are generally excluded from social dialogues 
and family decision-making. Psychologically, this group does not classify themselves as “victims 
of trafficking" but rather as "marriage migrants". They want nothing but support and recognition 
from society and to live a normal life with dignity. 
Equally important, for those who are trapped and forced to stay in China after they 
“married”, a broader definition of human trafficking needs to be put in place. Due to language 
barriers and the absence of legal protection, most of the victims are reluctant to seek help from 
 
3 This case study comes from our work with a local NGO. The NGO demand us to keep their confidential so the 
rescue program could continue in China. 
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local police. In some cases, even if they turn to the police, they encounter the problems of 
inefficient law enforcement and are sent back to their buyers.  
 
Unprotected Situation of DBT Victims: The Dysfunction of NGOs  
In most countries, NGOs play an equally important role as law enforcement in victim 
rescuing, reintegration, and prevention. However, in China, their impact is limited due to the 
restriction on their operations. Following the pass of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of 
China” in January 2017, all foreign NGOs in China have to submit to police supervision and 
declare sources of funding and allow the Chinese government to operate daily supervision and 
monitoring over them (BBC, 2016). The legislation also banned foreign NGOs from recruiting 
staff in mainland China, which made the local rescue program of human trafficking victims almost 
impossible.  
And for the Chinese NGOs, their scope of activities is restricted to only victims with 
Chinese nationality. Although it would be helpful if NGOs in China could raise awareness of 
potential male bride buyers with more information on the specific punishment for purchasing 
humans, few Chinese NGOs have this practice. Besides, stable cooperation between Chinese 
NGOs and NGOs in the GMS regions is also lacking. We interviewed many members of NGOs in 
Myanmar and Vietnam during our research who have shown a great desire to work with Chinese 
social groups. Just as one of them once pointed out, “[we understand] NGO operations are limited 
inside China, but they could at least help a bit with the translation, localization, and policy 
explanation.”  
Under this situation, overseas NGOs have now shifted their focus more on prevention. For 
instance, local NGOs such as Blue Dragon and Kachin Women’s Association in Thailand have set 
several advocating and education projects in Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar. They teach girls 
how to distinguish between real job offers and potential trafficking activities and deliver basic 
knowledge of self-protection, such as how to use “WeChat” (a Chinese communication app similar 
to WhatsApp) and how to contact the police in China. Nevertheless, these efforts are far away 
from reaching the needs of victims. 
 
Weak Regional Cooperation 
Regional cooperation has been settled since as early as 2004—the ministers of six 
governments of the GMS (Cambodia, China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) against Trafficking in 
Persons—but the situation is not getting better. Indeed, this memorandum was perceived as a “soft” 
law with no monitoring body, so it failed heavily in providing common norms for state members 
to address human trafficking in the region (Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Although it tried to provide a 
standard definition of trafficking, its language is vague and only “encourages” member countries 
to use the definition contained in the Palermo Protocol. Although MoU is a symbol of the regional 
cooperation among GMS countries, it can neither elaborate an explicit definition of human 
trafficking victims nor offer a practical way of implementing protection. 
Save the Children pointed out in our interview that two other factors that interfere with the 
implementation of regional cooperation between law enforcements are inadequate execution 
strategies and the collusion of corrupt officials. Traffickers are known to enlist the help of corrupt 
officials in recruiting victims and moving them across borders (Caballero-Anthony, 2018). This 
phenomenon is particularly rampant somehow due to the general financial improvement in 
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Southeast Asia. With the desire to further improve the local economy and surpass that of other 
areas, some villages protect and facilitate bride trafficking for extra earning. For instance, 
according to a news report in 2017, dozens of Thai police officials were found guilty in trafficking 
cases (Jirenuwat & Goldman, 2017). Compared to the mere inability of implementation, such 
collusion between the police and the traffickers no doubt brings much more severe consequences, 
along with an irredeemable decline in the credibility of the police.  
 
Deteriorated Situation under China’s Economic Influence 
In recent years, several NGOs and journalists have observed that the practice of human 
trafficking seems to be emerging in new areas alongside the expansion of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI)4 (Carvalho, 2020). A combination of enhanced mobility of labour between partner 
countries, the uneven development in certain regions, and extensive exploitation of the poor in 
rural areas has caused this rise in number of trafficking victims (Hedström, 2019). That is, although 
China’s investment has brought infrastructure development and more commercial opportunities, 
most of the money flows into the pockets of state-aligned investors and private sector companies. 
Take Myanmar as an example, the state-owned projects, such as Copper mines, benefit mostly the 
government and military forces in Myanmar5, but have displaced thousands of local people with a 
worse financial condition and a spoiled environment (IRIN, 2010). Since governments in the GMS 
repeatedly prioritise economic growth and energy development over the prevention of human 
trafficking, the scale of the problem continues to increase. 
 
 
The Urgency of Building a DBT-based Victim Identification System 
The external interventions, analysed in the previous section, are ineffective at pulling DBT 
victims out of their vulnerable situations. We argue that the focus of governments and NGOs must 
be shifted more to internal interventions—i.e., eliminating the ability of men to buy 
transnational/foreign brides and to actively offer assistance to DBT victims who are now still in 
China. 
Indeed, in recent years Beijing has made some improvements in the former, such as cutting 
off the demands from buyers after it committed to regional counter-human trafficking operations. 
The Chinese government made an amendment to its Criminal Law in 2015 to illegalize the 
comportment of purchasing humans for the first time. Thus, a buyer who hosts a trafficked woman 
and forces them to bear a child will face a combined punishment for offences of rape and 
accommodating a trafficked person.  
However, simply having this improvement on punitive justice is not enough. An enhanced 
restorative justice for victims is also urgently needed today, which can put its focus on helping the 
trafficked brides who have already been harmed. Yet what needs to be noticed is that this goal 
cannot be achieved with only one step. To be more exact, assisting the trafficked victims (no matter 
whether it is through rescue, rehabilitation, integration, legal help, or any other means) requires a 
sophisticated link which can connect the victims to the corresponding social service departments 
for help. This link should not only make these helpful resources—either national or foreign—
 
4 The Belt and Road Initiative (the Initiative), proposed by China in 2013, is aimed to boost China’s economic 
cooperation between Southeast Asian countries. 
5 The mine’s operators, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (UMEHL), which is owned by Myanmar’s 
military, and Myanmar Wanbao, a unit of China North Industries Corp, will get 19 percent and 30 per cent 
respectively. While the government of Myanmar holds 51 per cent of the profits (the Reuters 2013). 
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available and accessible to the victims, but also should be able to provide accurate and detailed 
information of the victims’ individualized situations and demands to the assisting departments. 
Hence, such an ideally effective and efficient “link” could only be made with a first-step victim 
identification system, which is well-grounded on a thorough and detailed categorization of victims. 
There is still some hope for the development of such a victim identification system. In 
China, the victims were generally considered “sanfei (三非)” before 2015, which represents people 
who are guilty for entering, residing, or working in China illegally. Once they have been caught 
by the police, they would face detention and repatriation regardless of the fact that they were 
trafficked. But fortunately, a preliminary victim identification system has started to operate in 
many areas in China, which means that once the victims of trafficking are identified, they would 
be sent to shelters and remain free from penalization (China News, 2020). 
The main problem for this preliminary victim identification system lies in the unclear/ 
inadequate criteria that Chinese laws and policies lay out for victims, none of which include the 
victims of demi-bride trafficking. For those who want to stay in China, the law leaves a gap that 
makes it difficult for the victims to obtain their legal status and social benefits. As for those who 
voluntarily move to China, they do not match the definition of “being cheated or forced ... [and] 
trafficked to the buyers” set out in China’s National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in 
Women and Children Trafficking (2013-2020). Thus, when they seek help, their cases are more 
likely to be treated as fraud or domestic violence.  
It's worth noting that in Jiangsu province, there are cases where trafficked girls who choose 
to stay in China voluntarily could be considered regular residents and become registered in the 
Chinese’ civil affairs system. In those cases, the girls are happy with their situations and come to 
the police for help. Once the local police confirm that they are not under threats, they help the girls 
obtain a family-reunion visa and marriage certificate. Also, community officers have the 
responsibility to raise awareness among local citizens about human trafficking and identify foreign 
brides to prevent potential cases of DBT.  
Such practices in Jiangsu province, though not representative across the nation, are a great 
blueprint for an ideal victim identification system in the future. Yet it is critical to note that such 
an individual-tailored victim identification and assistance system cannot easily be applied to a 
large geographical areas like China if there is not a strong and clear operation guide from the 
central government down to the local administrations that can ensure a consistent implementation 
of victim identification and assistance.  
This also explains why most current victims are still suffering from lack of identification 
as victims of human trafficking; they may be sent back to the buyers by the police, deported back 
to their home country, or face domestic violence or other kinds of gender-based abuse. These 
contrasting implementations of policies, compared to the ones in Jiangsu province, all demonstrate 
a prevalence of ambiguous central policies and information asymmetry between different levels of 
governments in China. The type of police intervention can also vary depending on the education 
and personal morals within a police department. According to one NGO that helps rescue 
trafficked girls in China, it is normal to see police officers from the same province operate in two 
opposite ways—one might give the girls money out of his own pocket to let them go back to their 
home country, while the other might accept a bribe from the fraudulent marriage brokers and turn 
a blind eye.  
Therefore, a detailed and thorough victim categorization on a theoretical and academic 
level—as outlined by our paper—is no doubt the first step to advancing protections for trafficked 
women, although it is far from enough. In order to bring DBT victim categorization into real 
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practice, we also require the consistency of policies and effective education programs for the 
relevant police officers, which could only come from a strong and clear anti-trafficking operation 




In summary, we would like to highlight the two tasks this paper tried to achieve. First, we 
analysed the unique characteristics of bride trafficking in China.  By using existing victim 
identification systems, we defined two new and distinct groups of victims as “demi-bride 
trafficking” victims. Sex-selective abortions and female infanticide caused by China’s one-child 
policy have led to a hugely unbalanced ratio between male and female citizens in China, and it 
further affected the bride market and human trafficking patterns in its neighbouring countries. 
Meanwhile, the poor economic or conflict situations of victims in their home countries and the 
long-existing tradition of using customary law in marriage added push factors for girls who were 
to marry Chinese men, voluntarily or involuntarily. These “outsiders” are excluded from the social 
system in China and face many practical problems including language barriers, rights restrictions, 
and lack of social supports. Therefore, their core needs are legal identity, social integration, and 
legal protection.  
Second, despite the descriptive nature of this study as well as the limitations of the data, 
this paper explored the challenges of the current operations by NGOs, regional cooperation, and 
governments. This paper then argued that the complex situation requires the consistency of policies 
among China’s central and local government in defining an individual-tailored victim protection 
system.  
As we pointed out in this paper, the larger social problem behind DBT is the imbalance of 
population development and the squeezed marriage market. Chinese men have difficulty finding a 
spouse in their domestic marriage market which leads them to look for alternative marriage 
arrangements. And finally, the expansion of the BRI has a potential to exacerbate and bring to the 
forefront the systemic and deeply entrenched economic and societal inequalities that are among 
the root causes of bride trafficking. Therefore, we call for future research to be conducted in more 
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